What lessons might epistemologists draw about the possibilities for cooperation in online networks, from evolutionary biology and evolutionary game theory in particular?…
Kantianism is false
To the extent that universalisability is a nice idea, it works well for the classic social dilemma: the prisoners' dilemma (or its multi-player equivalent, the tragedy of the commons). In such cases, there is one "cooperative" action which, if everyone performed it, would be best for the collective. But it is always better for each individual to abstain from cooperating. In such cases, we cannot rationally will that everyone abstain: that would defeat our rational aims. So there is a duty to cooperate.
Collective knowledge is easy — Ignorance is hard
Although collectives manage to do something that resembles the functional package of agency overall, they achieve this without any clear, isolatable analogue of beliefs, intentions, and the like. So we cannot identify any analogous failure of those "organs", even if we are confident that the package as a whole has failed. Collectives can be agents, and they can be subject to failures of agency. But their failures may not be classifiable as either ignorance or weakness of will.
Philosophy is not serious about being a discipline
… the speaker in a research presentation can expect to benefit more than the audience. The idea is somehow that the audience is there to ask questions which will help the speaker sharpen the argument, that the presentation will be an opportunity for enhancing the prestige of the speaker and generally satisfying his or her ego. All good for the speaker, to be sure; but the audience won't really learn much.
